Since Donald Trump’s re-election as the next president of the United States there has been much speculation as to how his presidency would change the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine war. While no official plans have been formulated, based on Trump’s previous remarks, as well as a peace plan published by his newly appointed special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, retired lieutenant general Keith Kellogg, it is expected that Trump may push for a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine (likely on Russia’s terms), potentially monitored by European peacekeeping forces. Many experts have explained the dangers of such a solution, and why it is unrealistic. But even if Trump succeeded in getting Ukraine and Russia to sign some type of a settlement, however unlikely, an even bigger mistake that the Trump administration is likely to make is downgrading Russia’s threat to American national interest in favor of shifting resources to tackle China and Iran. Equally erroneous is the idea that if Trump's “peace plan” were to work, the U.S. could reduce its military aid for Ukraine.
The new Trump administration has signaled that China and Iran, not Russia, will be America’s foreign policy priorities. Underestimating Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions and their threat to American national interests has been a characteristic of American foreign policy for at least two decades. This oversight has contributed to emboldening the Kremlin to use military aggression against its neighbors, most notably in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia to prop up Georgia's self-proclaimed republics and prevent Georgia from pursuing pro-Western orientation. Facing few, if any, repercussions for the Georgia invasion, the overconfident Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014. Once again, the West’s response failed to impress – having adopted the “let Russia be Russia” mindset, the West largely normalized Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Trump’s normalization of Putin’s regime in the current security environment will be even more catastrophic given the volatilities caused by the ongoing wars in the Middle East, and the growing military, economic, and political ties between China, Iran, Russia and North Korea – all seeking to undermine the power of the U.S. and its allies.
Regardless of how successful the Trump administration may be in “ending the war” in Ukraine, Moscow will not change its aggressive foreign policy toward its neighbors and beyond. Nor will it change its strategic objective of dismantling the U.S.-led transatlantic and global order. From Putin’s point of view, the West is already at war with Russia. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russia perceives Ukraine as acting at the behest of the West, Russia’s main adversary. Hence, Moscow views its war with Ukraine as an asymmetric war against a superior opponent, NATO. As Kaupo Rosin, head of Estonian intelligence, wrote in a 2024 report, “in the Kremlin’s mindset, they are not only fighting Ukrainians, but their chosen path involves a long-term confrontation with the entire ‘collective West’.” Given Russia’s strategic objectives of undermining the power of western democracies, Moscow is expected to use any pause in fighting to ramp up its military production, rebuild its armed forces, regroup, and restrike. Contrary to some western experts’ claims that Russia’s threat to Europe is unjustifiably inflated, most European governments assess Russia’s threat as both more serious and more imminent.
Thus, at the end of 2024, both German and Estonian intelligence services agreed in their assessment that Russia’s posture toward the West had been increasingly more aggressive and that Russia could launch a direct assault on NATO by 2030. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius gave an even starker warning that Russia could seek to attack a NATO member state within five to eight years, while his Danish counterpart suggested that Russia’s willingness to test NATO’s Article 5 could happen even sooner – within three to five years. With a similar sense of urgency, in January of last year, the chief of the British Army, General Patrick Sanders, called on the British public to prepare for a war with Russia not only by strengthening the British armed forces, but also by making a mental “shift” in the public’s perception of Russia as an enemy.
In contrast, the U.S.’s assessment of Russia’s threat to NATO has been somewhat toned down compared to that of Europeans. Thus, the annual threat assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community published in February 2024 stated that “Russia almost certainly does not want a direct military conflict with U.S. and NATO forces and will continue asymmetric activity below what it calculates to be the threshold of military conflict globally.” The report did, however, acknowledge that Russia “directly threatened the United States in an attempt to assert leverage regionally and globally” while highlighting that “Russia’s strengthening ties with China, Iran, and North Korea to bolster its defense production and economy are a major challenge for the West and partners.”
Complicating the matter is the fact that in the U.S., perceptions of the degree of Russia’s threat have been increasingly diverging along party lines. In 2022, approximately half of Republicans and half of Democrats viewed the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to the U.S. national interests. However, in 2024, only 19 percent of Republicans said that Russia’s invasion was a major threat to U.S. interests, compared with 42 percent of Democrats. Given the prospects of Republican control of both chambers of the U.S. Congress, as well as the White House, it is highly probable that the U.S. government will continue downgrading Russia’s threat in its system of national priorities. This oversight may not only lead to more devastation and deaths in Ukraine, but also buy Russia valuable time in modernizing its military and challenging America’s power and interests globally.
The U.S. can no longer afford downplaying Russia’s military ambitions, not least due to the growing military ties between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. The Russia-Iran partnership alone is responsible for two of the world’s deadliest conflicts – in Ukraine and Syria, and plays a significant role in challenges of concern to the U.S., including “nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, authoritarian resurgence, disinformation campaigns, human rights violations, illicit finance, and the weaponization of energy resources.” Yet, America is woefully unprepared to tackle those challenges. A recent report commissioned by the U.S. Congress painted a bleak picture of the state of America’s defense – America’s level of military preparedness is the lowest it has been in 80 years, while its odds of fighting a major war are the highest.
In their recent Foreign Affairs article, General Mark Milley, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google, warned that the United States was unprepared for the wars of the future. While America still outspends Russia and China in AI, it “could struggle to overcome the bureaucratic and industrial obstacles to deploying its inventions on the battlefield.” The two experts caution that it will not be enough for the U.S. officials to change and adapt to the new security environment, they must “do so faster than their country’s adversaries.” Time is of the essence. America no longer has the luxury of normalizing Russia and giving it valuable time to rebuild its military machine.
President-elect Trump on several occasions advanced the idea that Europeans should become self-sufficient in their defense needs. Thus, he suggested that Europeans should absorb the costs for sending an armed peacekeeping force to Ukraine, as well as proposed that NATO members should raise defense spending from two to five percent of gross domestic product.
However, Europeans do not need Trump to tell them that they need to spend more on defense. European defense spending began to grow as early as a decade ago, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and only increased further in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Faced with significant ammunition and weapon production shortfalls and the inability to meet Ukraine’s defense needs adequately, in March 2024, European Union officials adopted the first ever defense industrial strategy to enhance Europe's readiness and security. The new strategy reflects a “paradigm shift from emergency response to defense readiness” and sets a clear, long-term vision to achieve such readiness. As part of the new strategy, the EU aims to streamline procurement to make it easier for European governments to identify projects of common interest – such as cyber defense capabilities, integrated European air and missile defense systems, and other needs – and pool funds to procure the needed capabilities.
These are steps in the right direction, but it will take Europeans years to overcome many institutional, political and economic problems to get its defense industrial base on proper war footing. Meanwhile, despite sanctions, Russia has dramatically increased the production of artillery rounds, long-range missiles, and drones since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as reported by the UK's leading defense think tank RUSI, and is preparing for the long war.
In the current security environment, the U.S. letting up on European defense would be playing into Russia’s hands. Even if the Trump administration would somehow be able to pause the war between Russia and Ukraine, this would not solve Ukraine’s and Europe’s long-term defense challenges. Europeans lack adequate resources to assist with Ukraine’s long-term defense capabilities, force quality, and sustainment needs without America’s support. The U.S. military aid to Ukraine will need to continue, paired with long-term deterrence and defense mechanisms against Russia’s future aggression.
Contrary to some experts’ claims that military aid to Ukraine would reduce America’s readiness for conflict in higher priority theaters, such as the Indo-Pacific, American military aid to Ukraine has not only benefited the American economy, but it has been a catalyst of long overdue reforms in the U.S. military defense production. The vast majority of America’s military aid for Ukraine has already gone, or will go, straight back into the U.S. economy either through reimbursing American employees for military education and training provided to the Ukrainian government or other foreign countries supporting Ukraine, or by awarding contracts to American weapons manufacturers to replenish U.S. stockpiles. One analysis found that as much as 90 percent of the $68 billion in military and related assistance the US provided since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022 has gone to Americans.
Additionally, military aid to Ukraine has already stimulated “capability development and organizational change” in the American defense establishment. Since 2022, the U.S. government has mobilized its defense industrial base by increasing orders on certain items relevant to Ukraine’s current battlefield needs, as well as modernizing domestic ammunition manufacturing capabilities. The U.S. has also leveraged its power to encourage and coordinate the global production of materiel for Ukraine. The resultant capacity expansion will also improve U.S. military readiness.
In the current strategic environment, the effectiveness of militaries in no small measure depends on governments’ ability to integrate technological innovations into their defense infrastructure at scale and with the speed exceeding those of the competitors. The Russo-Ukraine war has revolutionized defense technology at an unprecedented speed. It has also demonstrated the critical importance of effective public-private cooperation, especially in the defense sector, to national survival. Both Russia and Ukraine have increasingly relied on advanced technology like unmanned aerial systems to achieve military goals. Russia has already been deploying unmanned ground vehicles that can launch anti-tank explosives. Ukraine’s expanded use of ground robots has included casualty evacuation and explosive disposal. Ukraine’s ingenuity at rapidly turning commercial technology into military capability has played a significant role in Ukraine’s effective resistance against Russian forces.
The U.S.’s cumbersome bureaucracy puts it at a disadvantage in its competition with authoritarian states that can adopt changes, including in the public-private cooperation, more quickly. Additionally, the U.S. military is plagued by “budgets that are too small, spending bills passed too late, legacy weapons preferred over new ones and a public either unaware of the challenges America faces or unmotivated to respond,” states a recent report on American military readiness commissioned by the U.S. Congress. To better harness technology coming out of the private sector, Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, called for critical reforms to the defense budgeting process including “speeding up the Pentagon’s slow procurement and acquisition processes.”
Ukraine is now a global hub for defense innovation and a fertile ground for foreign investment. While resisting a large-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense industry has experienced an extraordinary boom: the country has exponentially increased the production of its own drones, missiles, electronic warfare systems, and other military kit to meet the needs of soldiers fighting on the front lines. Ukraine’s first deputy minister of defense, lieutenant general Ivan Havryliuk, reported that last year alone the ministry adopted and codified the use of more than 900 domestically produced weapons and equipment. At the end of last year, Ukraine held the second international defense industries forum which attracted representatives of more than 280 defense companies and associations from some 30 countries and resulted in numerous new agreements and contracts signed.
Given the limited capacity and political will of Ukraine’s partners to provide for Ukraine’s defense needs long-term, the U.S. and Europe should prioritize enhancing Ukraine’s domestic arms production capabilities as an investment in a more self-sufficient and secure Ukraine, which is a keystone of Europe’s security.
Regardless of how Trump approaches peace-making in Ukraine, it is fully expected that his administration will continue pushing Europeans toward making bigger contributions to Ukraine’s defense, as well as transatlantic security and defense writ large. Trump should also let Europeans lead the way in assessing Russia’s threat to the “collective West” and shaping transatlantic deterrence and defense strategy vis-a-vis Russia accordingly.
While pushing Europeans to step up their defense efforts, the Trump administration should not lose sight of the fact that American defense production must be revolutionized as well, and that it is best achieved in close cooperation with Europe, as well as Ukraine. More critically, the Trump administration should reconsider reducing American military aid for Ukraine – continued military aid will not only preserve Ukraine as a viable state and slow down the Russian military machine, but it will also advance America’s defense industrial base, as well as add credibility to American deterrence against its adversaries around the world.
The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the urgency of optimizing public-private cooperation in defense innovation. Trump’s recently announced nominations of industry representatives to shape defense policy may offer optimism for long overdue improvements in harnessing technological innovation in the commercial sector for national defense. The Trump administration presents many other opportunities to improve America’s deterrence and defense, as one of the leading American defense scholars Kori Schake asserts, but only if the new president takes more risks to ensure that Russia’s war fails.
No less important than policy changes is the need to cultivate a defense readiness culture across all government institutions and among the general public in the U.S. This defense readiness culture must be based on a clear understanding of the dangers of the rapidly changing security environment in which American adversaries, chief among them Russia, have been getting more belligerent and aggressive in challenging American power. This cognitive shift begins with a clear understanding that Ukraine is the first line of defense against Russia and other authoritarian regimes seeking to weaken western democracies.
Olena Lennon, Ph.D., is a GGI Non-resident Senior Fellow, and a Practitioner in Residence in the Department of National Security at the University of New Haven in the U.S.
Photo credit: EPA Images
