On 5 November 2024, INTERPOL elected its next Secretary General (SG), Valdecy Urquiza of Brazil. The new SG will inherit a successful and productive global governance organization, as well as substantial challenges to the organisation’s future growth. INTERPOL is an important intergovernmental organization (IGO) with 196 member countries. Its main roles are to facilitate the exchange of information about crimes and criminals, provide training and share best practices, and generally bring law enforcement officials from all of its members together for cooperation and collaboration. Unlike popular portrayals in fiction, INTERPOL “agents” do not travel around the world finding and arresting criminals – though they do travel around the world to train and assist police as requested.
INTERPOL has steadily grown in size and responsibility since its foundation in 1923. The 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the United States transformed the organization, propelling its visibility and activities. In the 15 years under SG Ron Noble’s leadership, INTERPOL expanded its geographic presence, going beyond its headquarters in Lyon, France, to open liaison offices in Africa, the Americas, and Asia.
The organization was especially suited to assist its members in the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’ in investigating foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and assisting with major terror attack investigations. But terrorism was not its only focus. It also did, and continues to do, extensive work on crimes against children, cybercrime, and organized crime among many other areas.
One of the organizations major accomplishments was that is managed to prosper and develop despite deepening interstate rivalries. When the Russo-Ukraine crisis escalated in 2014 with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, for example, then-Secretary General Jürgen Stock successfully minimized its impact on the organization’s functions and relations amidst a deepening divide in Europe. When INTERPOL’s general assembly voted by majority to accept Palestine as a member country over US and Israeli objections (among other members), the US not only was muted in its condemnation of INTERPOL (in contrast to its reaction to Palestine joining UNESCO which saw the US suspend a 60 million US dollar payment to the organization and then leave UNESCO altogether). Rather, the US gave INTERPOL several million dollars for a criminal database system soon after the vote. Israel’s reaction was no different from that of the US. It continued to engage with INTERPOL, with Israel maintaining its seconded officer in the organization (interestingly, at one point, in the same unit as the sole Iranian seconded official).
Unfortunately, yesterday’s successes do not automatically guarantee continued success tomorrow. While INTERPOL is unlikely to join the ranks of the deceased or zombie-like intergovernmental organizations, the new SG will confront difficult challenges to global governance and INTERPOL’s role within it. A new Cold War has arguably descended on Europe, if not the world. Great power rivalries rarely tend to help intergovernmental organizations, and INTERPOL’s new SG might have his hands full. While INTERPOL members’ golden rule of “INTERPOL may not anything within a country against its will, but may do anything within a country with its approval,” significantly insulates the organization from UN Security Council-like deadlock, present and emerging challenges will certainly stress the organization. The Russo-Ukraine war has already created, and will likely continue to generate accusations of war crimes. These come from not just the International Criminal Court, Ukraine, and European Union, but also from Moscow. With accusations of crimes usually come accusations against suspects – which for the average crime, INTERPOL is well equipped to handle and support. Indeed, its notices system among other capabilities is a great tool for combatting crime. However, even though INTERPOL claims to support war crimes investigations and judicial procedures, the reality for the organization is much more complicated.
War crimes are more often than not committed by government officials, during war. INTERPOL’s Article 3 of its constitution specifically prohibit it from “engaging in matters of political, military, religious and racial character.” Nothing is more military and political than an interstate war. Second, INTERPOL has always struggled to deal with accusations against serving government officials. INTERPOL succeeds in part because all states are considered equal; there is no weighted system of membership based on power or contributions and there is no veto power granted to certain countries. Thus, INTERPOL cannot favour one country over another from a military or political perspective. Moreover, INTERPOL cannot function well if it finds itself in the position of issuing notices and diffusions against officials with whom it works directly.
The challenge, then, will be if and when states are throwing not just accusations of war crimes back and forth, but issuing national or regional arrest warrants, issuing INTERPOL diffusions, or requesting INTERPOL notices. It took INTERPOL over 10 years to figure out how to address accusations against Iranian officials suspected of being involved in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, Argentina. That case involved only nine red notice requests. The problem with choices involving the Russo-Ukraine War will be that any decision to act or not act will probably be condemned by no small number of countries.
For the first time, INTERPOL will have a SG from the so-called ‘Global South’. This may help in navigating the new cold war’s minefield, but ultimately the INTERPOL SG represents the organization, not his or her home country. Secretary General Urquiza will be confronted with difficult decisions in the coming five to ten years, and will find that keeping INTERPOL on the path to neutral success may be more difficult than any time in the past.
Image credit: interpol.int
